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Athahn Steinback

Dark Apostles – Hitler’s Oligarchs: Göring, Goebbels,
Himmler, Heydrich and Revolutionary Totalitarian
Oligarchy in the Third Reich
By Athahn Steinback

Abstract: In popular memory, the Third Reich and the Nazi party
are all too often misremembered as a homogenous entity, entirely
shaped and led by the figure of Adolf Hitler. This paper challenges
the widely held misconception of a homogenous Nazi ideology and
critically re-examines the governance of Nazi Germany by arguing
that the Third Reich was not a generic totalitarian dictatorship,
but rather, a revolutionary totalitarian oligarchy. The unique roles
and revolutionary agendas of Hermann Göring, Joseph Goebbels,
Heinrich Himmler, and Reinhard Heydrich, provide case studies to
demonstrate the nature of this revolutionary totalitarian oligarchy.
The role of Hitler as the chief oligarch of Nazi Germany remains
critical to the entire system of governance. However, the unique
roles played by his subordinate oligarchs must be explored in
order to properly understand the function, radicalization and
unprecedented destruction wrought by the Third Reich.

Adolf Hitler – the mere mention of the name conjures a toxic
witch’s brew that still sears the psyche of modern Western
Civilization. From World War II to the Holocaust, there is virtually
no aspect of contemporary society left unscathed by the collective
memory of Hitler and the Nazi party. The staggering power of his
legacy makes it easy to take the NSDAP’s slogan of 'Ein Volk, ein
Reich, ein Führer' at face value and consequently fail to recognize
the true nature of the Nazi state edifice upon which he stood.1 To
properly understand Hitler, the Third Reich, and the Nazi
movement, it is critical that we not ignore the formative role
played by others – the oligarchs who carved out personal empires
1

The Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German
Worker’s Party) or Nazi party. The party’s slogan, Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein
Führer, translates to, “one people, one state, one leader.”
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within the Byzantine bureaucracy of the Third Reich and dispensed
their power based on Führer principle,2 just as Hitler himself did.
The Third Reich was in reality a revolutionary totalitarian
oligarchy, ruled by many lesser führers all beholden to the one
dominant Führer – Adolf Hitler.
The popular, and simplistic, view of Hitler as sole architect
of the Third Reich - the singular all-powerful dictator directing
every aspect of the state - has long since been banished from
serious discourse by historical giants such as Hugh Trevor-Roper,
Martin Broszat, and Ian Kershaw. In reality, Hitler derived the
greatest extent of his power through his indispensable role as the
chief arbitrator in the internecine struggles of his squabbling
oligarchs. Yet, the question remains, what was the nature of this
“confusion of private empires”3 or “shapeless ‘system’ of
governance?”4 Much of Hitler’s power was indeed derived from
his role as the supreme Führer, holding sway over the numerous
miniature empires of his lieutenants. Kershaw’s concept of
working towards the Führer continues to provide the most effective
mechanism for explaining the ceaseless radicalization of the Third
Reich, yet to call the system “shapeless” is somewhat misleading.
To clearly understand the Third Reich and normalize its role in the
greater fabric of European history, it is imperative that it be
identified for what it was – a revolutionary totalitarian oligarchy.
The Third Reich was revolutionary in that it desired to
completely re-order the social, political and economic structure of
society in a manner no less ambitious than its Marxist rivals. It was
totalitarian in that it required not only the loyalty of its subjects but
also their total ideological commitment to the movement.
Simultaneously, the numerous and conflicting personal empires of
the greatest power brokers within the NSDAP guaranteed that the
Reich's governance was inherently oligarchic from its inception.
These three characteristics defined the National Socialist system
and paved the way for the explosive expansion of NSDAP
dominion over the German political scene. Fueled by revolutionary
2

Führerprinzip or Leader (Führer) Principle in English, is the concept that final
authority in any given system or situation always rest in the hands of a single,
decisive leader and that subordinates should give their total, unconditional
loyalty to their Führer.
3
Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, 6th ed. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992), 54.
4
Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 1936-1945 Nemesis (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000),
573.
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aspirations, enforced by the iron fist of totalitarian repression and
served by numerous, expansionist internal empires, the NSDAP
stood poised to carve up Germany and Europe itself to feed the
insatiable need of the movement to ceaselessly expand, lest the
very same revolutionary oligarchs who engineered the National
Socialist state turn their ambitions upon one another.
National Socialism was an inherently revolutionary
ideology, bent on radically restructuring society along the lines of
the völkisch state5 and replacing bourgeois society with a biocracy
based upon an ascending racial hierarchy that placed Germanic
“Aryans” at the very pinnacle. As was also the case with its
splintered Marxist opponent, the perception of this revolution
varied widely amongst National Socialists. Hermann Göring
sought to gradually subvert the German economy from within,
leading to its systematic incorporation into the party’s
revolutionary mission. Ernst Röhm6 called for a “brown
revolution” to sweep away bourgeois society and replace it with a
new, wholly National Socialist order. While, Heinrich Himmler
sought to completely re-imagine society along the lines of blood,
soil, and a racially pure SS warrior community. In each case,
National Socialism's revolutionary zeitgeist was evident. However,
these and other numerous competing visions of the movement’s
mission produced fractious and often competing policies. As a
result, governance of the Third Reich is best recognized as a
revolutionary totalitarian oligarchy in which several oligarchs
controlled their own administrative kingdoms and pursued their
own unique visions of National Socialism within their respective
spheres. It would not be too much to call these oligarchic personal
empires franchises of the revolution, wherein each oligarch, be it
5

The precise conceptualization of the volkisch state differed from oligarch to
oligarch. However, themes of a collectivist state based upon racial purity and the
Führer Principle were common to all leading National Socialists.
6
Ernst Julius Günther Röhm (1887-1934) was a leading National Socialist
revolutionary, long time personal friend of Hitler, head of the powerful
Sturmabteilung (SA) and vocal leader within the party’s left wing. Following the
NSDAP’s rise to power in 1933, Röhm agitated for the immediate, forceful
nationalization of industry, elimination of aristocratic estates, and, most
critically, incorporation of the armed forces into Röhm’s significantly larger
paramilitary SA. Ultimately, Röhm’s significant power base and left wing
agenda drew him into conflict with the party establishment and he was purged,
along with his allies, during the Night of the Long Knives in 1934.
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Göring, Goebbels, Himmler, or Heydrich, pursued the objectives
of the National Socialist mission as they personally envisioned it.
When viewed through this lens the Nazi state becomes
infinitely easier to understand. Bureaucrats at all levels within the
Nazi hierarchy ceaselessly toiled to make the movement's
objectives a reality, and while some were motivated by cynical
self-aggrandizement, many more labored under a genuine belief in
National Socialism as a revolutionary mission – the dawn of a new
chapter in world history. At the head of this revolution, Hitler
established himself as a new messiah, while the most influential of
his oligarchs desired to become his greatest apostles, each in turn
dictating their own twisted gospel to their followers. Although
Hitler's would-be apostles were numerous, four, Hermann Göring,
Joseph Goebbels, Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich, stand
out above the others as singularly powerful men within the
revolution and the Nazi state. Each possessed great ambition,
power, revolutionary zeal, and the will to acquire vast personal
empires; and in doing so, they became far more than mere
functionaries of Hitler’s will. They enjoyed political agency of
their own accord and actively, even enthusiastically, endeavored to
further the National Socialist revolution through any means at their
disposal. Who were these men? What power did they wield? What
great bureaucratic kingdoms did they lord over and what motivated
their actions? These are the questions I seek to address.

Hermann Göring – The Consummate Fascist Politician
Only he who emphasizes German socialism is truly
national. He who refuses to speak of socialism, who
believes in socialism only in the Marxist sense, or to
whom the word “socialism” has an unpleasant ring,
has not understood the deepest meaning of
nationalism. He has not understood that one can only
be a nationalist when one sees social problems
openly and clearly. And on the other hand, one can
only be a socialist when he clearly sees that
nationalism must triumph to protect the living space
of a people from outside forces. – Hermann Göring,
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speech to the National Socialist Factory Cell
Organization, April 9, 1933.7
We must strive with the greatest energy for autarky
in all spheres in which it is technically possible.
– Hermann Göring, cabinet meeting on the economy,
September 4, 1936.8
Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought
to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you
have to do is tell them they are being attacked and
denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and
exposing the country to danger. It works the same
way in any country. – Hermann Göring, interview at
Nuremberg, April 18, 1946.9
Hermann Göring is too often dismissed as a brash amateur
politician, or failed Air Marshal possessing little political flare or
administrative acumen. Indeed, Göring’s taste for ostentatious
uniforms, decadent banquets, art theft, and habit of attaching his
name to everything he laid his hands on – from his famous
Reichswerke to a Panzer Division - makes the Reichsmarschall an
easy mark to be readily disregarded as just another insufferably
narcissistic oligarch. While Göring's narcissism was well
documented, and the man’s failures numerous, to dismiss him outof-hand misses his significant contribution to securing Nazi control
over Germany. The failure to comprehend Göring’s decisive
contribution to the Nazification of the German economy is to
fundamentally misunderstand the Third Reich. It is in the field of
the economy as Plenipotentiary of the Second Four-Year Plan that
Göring exerted his greatest influence and left an indelible mark on
the evolution of Nazi Germany. His future career as
Reichsmarschall at the head of the Luftwaffe was significant but
paled in comparison to his role in the Second Four-Year Plan.
Hermann Göring, “Nationalism and Socialism” (speech, Berlin, April 9, 1933),
trans. Randall Bytwerk, Calvin College, German Propaganda Archive,
http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/goering1.htm.
8
Hermann Göring to the Reich Cabinet, September 4, 1936, in Documents on
Nazism, 1919-1945, by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham (New York: The
Viking Press, 1974), 409.
9
Hermann Göring, qtd. in Gustave M. Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary (Boston: Da
Capo Press, 1995), 278-279.
7
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To begin to properly understand Göring’s political empire
and contributions to the Third Reich, it is essential to understand
his character and motivations. Like his colleagues, Goebbels,
Himmler, and Heydrich, Göring was driven by great ambition. He
saw himself as a man in both worlds – simultaneously emulating
the trappings of a decadent elite of an age then-pas whilst actively
engineering a new National Socialist system to sweep away the
old. This dichotomy stands at the core of Göring’s character and
underlies the primary obstacle in lucidly appraising his actions and
ambitions.
Göring’s agenda simultaneously reflected the views of
revolutionary National Socialists and late Weimar era imperialrevisionists.10 He himself hailed from the lower spectrum of the
bourgeoisie, and was molded by pre-Great War perceptions of
idealized Prussian virtues of duty and loyalty to the state; a state
that had fallen in 1918, and had been replaced by something
entirely alien to his authoritarian worldview – democracy. In some
respects, Göring differed little from mainstream imperialrevisionists of his time; his foreign policy opinions sought the
creation of a German sphere of influence in East and Southeastern
Europe through the formation of an anti-Bolshevik alliance,
secured by the bulwark of a friendly Polish state between Germany
and its Soviet rival.11 It was an alliance that would serve as a
protective shield against communism – a force that Göring
emphatically feared – while simultaneously securing a potent
continental economic bloc that could expand both the Reich's and
Göring’s economic reach far beyond the borders of the empire.12
In this regard, he took his cues from traditional
Bismarckian statecraft, favoring a traditional balance of power and
alliances built to protect the interests of Germany – like any
mainstream imperial revisionist.13 Consequently, in foreign policy
Göring actively swam against the current of Hitlerian National
Socialism and the concept of lebensraum that increasingly

10

Imperial-revisionists hoped to re-establish the power of the Pre-World War
One German Empire.
11
Alfred Kube, “Hermann Goering: Second Man in the Third Reich,” in The
Nazi Elite, ed. Ronald Smelser and Rainer Zitelmann (New York: New York
University Press, 1993), 66.
12
Kube, “Hermann Goering: Second Man in the Third Reich,” 67.
13
Ibid., 70-71.
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dominated Nazi ideology.14 Yet, despite this, Göring had no
interest nor desire in confronting Hitler's expansionist worldview.
He was, as his economic policies clearly demonstrated, very much
a fascist at heart. However, like most Nazi oligarchs, the future
Reichsmarschall was a creature of ambition who actively pursued
whatever strategy combined the extension of his personal empire
with the goals of the National Socialist revolution. His foreign
policy endeavors had simply been one tactic in a broad effort to
spread his influence into another pillar of the state. When Hitler
rejected this traditionalist approach in favor of Ribbentrop’s15
aggressive expansionism, Göring simply turned his attention to
other matters – it was of no pressing concern to him.
In stark contrast to his imperial-revisionist foreign policy,
Göring aggressively pursued the Nazification of the economy as
Plenipotentiary of the Four-Year Plan. His fascist economic
policies were perfectly captured in a 1938 speech before the
German Labor Front; “Just as I will be resolved to ignore the fate
of individuals, if the well-being of the community demands it, I
shall not show weakness in placing the interests of the Volk above
the interests of individual businesses.”16 These were neither hollow
words, nor an idle threat. Göring was prepared to fight Germany's
traditional economic elite for unfettered control of the economy.
They could either join him, or he would destroy them. While
Göring did not espouse the utopian collectivist views of his fellow
oligarch and head of the German Labor Front, Robert Ley,17 his

14

Lebensraum or living space in English, was the concept that the German
people needed to conquer land (usually in the Soviet east) in order to survive
and prosper. The local populations would either be annihilated, enslaved or
driven out after the conquest to make way for German settlers.
15
Ulrich Friedrich Wilhelm Joachim von Ribbentrop (1893-1946) served as the
Foreign Minister of Nazi Germany, from 1938 to 1945. He was most famous for
his key role in brokering an alliance with Fascist Italy in 1939 as well as a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union the same year.
16
Hermann Göring, qtd. in Richard Overy, Goering The ‘Iron Man’ (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 51.
17
Robert Ley (1890-1945) was a minor oligarch at the head of the German
Labor Front (DAF), an organization that served as the party replacement for the
forcibly dissolved trade unions. His career was marked by an endless – and
unsuccessful – quest to transform the DAF into an omnipresent party
bureaucracy with a self-appointed mission to rid society of internal conflict by
assimilating it entirely into a volkisch collective based on racial purity. His
utopian ambitions would unsurprisingly fail as a consequence of his own wanton
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economic objectives were nothing short of revolutionary. He
viewed his revolution as “systematic.”18 There would be no worker
occupation of factories, no collectivization of industry. The
nation's industrial base would be delivered step by step, piece by
piece into the hands of the Fuhrer, as tools belonging to the state,
anyone brave or foolish enough to stand in his way would be
destroyed.
Within a year of his appointment as Plenipotentiary of the
Second Four-Year Plan in 1936, Göring had successfully crushed
or co-opted Germany's traditional economic elite. Despite fierce
opposition from the Ruhr steel magnates, led by then Minister of
Finance Hjalmar Schacht,19 who opposed rearmament and the
nationalization of industry as poor economic policy. 20 His tactics in
this war on big business were essentially the same as every other
major campaign of civic subversion in the Third Reich. If the
senior executives in private corporations opposed the NSDAP’s
agenda, then politically reliable, mid-level management was
systematically encouraged to marginalize defiant bosses and usurp
their positions.21 Those who joined the party were rewarded, while
those who continued to resist were gradually swept into obscurity
by the swelling ranks of their National Socialist co-workers.
Simultaneously, Göring transformed his office into a shadow
ministry and usurped much of Schacht's official powers for himself
– not because he legally had any right to do so or because he held
special qualification, but rather because he could and his goals
were in alignment with Hitler’s wishes. The Führer subsequently
dismissed Schacht’s protests out of hand, and Göring was free to
remake economic policy in the Reich as he saw fit.22
Consequently, Göring increasingly asserted direct control
over the entire German economy, but particularly renitent hold
corruption, alcoholism, mental instability, conflict with opposing oligarchs and
the outbreak of the Second World War.
18
Overy, Goering The 'Iron Man', 27.
19
Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht (1877-1970) was a wealthy conservative
economist and banker who threw his support behind – but never joined – the
Nazi party in the last years of the Weimar Republic in an abortive attempt to
reclaim Germany’s place on the world stage. After the party’s rise to power, he
spent the next four years futilely attempting to stymie the autarkic, anti-freemarket economic policies of the NSDAP.
20
Overy, Goering The 'Iron Man', 47, 71.
21
Ibid., 56-57.
22
Ibid., 56.
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outs – like Schacht and his fellow Ruhr steel magnates – remained
troublesome. In June of 1937, Göring responded to their continued
defiance by declaring his intention to establish his very own
Reichswerke as a state-owned corporation under his control.23 He
was simultaneously challenging the Ruhr magnates on their own
turf and firmly establishing an outpost of his empire in the most
important industry in Germany – steel. Despite their traditional
privileged position in German politics, even the Ruhr magnates
found themselves completely helpless to protect their own
corporations from Göring’s burgeoning economic dominion.
Two months later, the steel magnates prepared their last act
of resistance – the “Dusseldorf Memorandum,” a document that
roundly excoriated Göring and the Nazi party's autarkic economic
planning. For his part, Göring remained informed about his
opponent’s every move through his personal nationwide
wiretapping service, the so-called “Forschungsamt.” Aware of his
opponents’ intentions, Göring struck before any coherent
resistance could be mounted by immediately ordering each of the
magnates be arrested, although he was subsequently convinced by
a subordinate to avoid a national incident and chose to blackmail
them individually instead. In the end, they could either sign the
memorandum and be regarded as saboteurs or abandon their
resistance and fall in line.24 With the capitulation of the steel
magnates, the Nazification of the economy and the concurrent
establishment of Göring's personal economic empire were
confirmed. In November, following Schacht’s resignation as
Minister of Economics, Göring briefly occupied the office and
made it his first priority to call Schacht and exclaim, “I am now
sitting in your chair!”25
In modern political parlance, Hermann Göring had become
what we might now call an “Economic Tsar.” His complete lack of
economic expertise was irrelevant to the National Socialist mission
so long as he continued to carry out Hitler’s wishes – to fund
rearmament. More pressingly, from Göring’s point of view he had
carved an entire piece of the Reich out for himself. All roads in the
economy led to his office and he avoided delegating his authority
to underlings as much as possible – he simply applied the Führer
principle to his own office where he ruled as the master of his own
23

Overy, Goering The 'Iron Man', 64.
Ibid., 65.
25
Hermann Göring, qtd. in Overy, Goering The 'Iron Man', 68.
24
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miniature Reich. His eponymous Reichswerke continued to expand
steadily, first in Germany and then benefiting from his political
largesse to acquire the majority of captured factories in the newly
invested territories – particularly those in Austria and
Czechoslovakia.26 While it is true, as Richard Overy contends, that
contrary to popular belief, Göring saw little personal profit from
his sprawling Reichswerke (at its height the largest corporation in
Europe, if not the world) and remained firmly detached from its
day-to-day operations.27 Göring did gain was an incalculable
political asset. To take a page from Karl Marx, through the
Reichswerke, Göring wrestled control over the means of
production for the German war machine and placed himself in
position to benefit from the captured assets of conquered nations in
a way that no other oligarch could remotely dream. The
establishment of the Reichswerke, and his special relationship to it,
was a master-stroke political maneuver for his personal empire, as
well as a critical flaw in the long-term health of the Reich. The
Reichswerke continued to serve as one of the fundamental
linchpins of the Göring empire until 1942, when its bloated size,
gross inefficiency, and Germany’s declining fortunes in the war
finally compelled him to release the Reichswerke’s weapon and
munitions factories to the Ministry of Armaments.28
Göring repeated his efforts to consolidate the growing
power of the National Socialist state with a concurrent expansion
of his personal power in the Luftwaffe. His acquisition of the
Aviation Ministry in 1933 was an early political victory for the
future Reichsmarschall, but a comparatively minor one at a time
when the nation's air forces were still technically subordinate to the
Supreme Commander of the military and Minister of Defense –
then General Werner von Blomberg. Undeterred, from 1933 to
1938, Göring gradually worked to bring the revolution into the
highest ranks of the Luftwaffe by appointing dedicated Nazis like
Erhard Milch and Albert Kesselring to positions of power at the
expense of established army air specialists with dubious
commitment to the party.29

26

Richard Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995), 114.
27
Overy, Goering The 'Iron Man', 65.
28
Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, 164.
29
Overy, Goering The 'Iron Man', 33-34.
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Slowly but surely, Göring established his personal presence
in the most sacred pillar of the German state – the armed forces.
The evolving Luftwaffe was hollowed out and re-purposed as a
shell for Göring’s emergent petty kingdom and after 1937,
strengthened by his uncontested power within the economy. He
placed himself in a perfect position to favor the Luftwaffe during
rearmament – controlling both the military budget and the
Luftwaffe. Ever the opportunist, it would be only a matter of time
before he challenged the army’s preeminence over the entire
military establishment. In 1938, with his nascent Reichswerke
extending its tendrils throughout German industry and the
Luftwaffe booming amidst general rearmament, Göring seized the
opportunity to attempt to definitively establish himself as the
unassailable second most powerful man in the Reich – by
intriguing to usurp General von Blomberg's office as Commander
in Chief of the armed forces.
What path Göring might have chosen to assert the
Luftwaffe’s total independence of the army, or attempt to establish
his own dominance over the armed services, we will never know –
because random chance struck in his favor in January of 1938.
General von Blomberg, a widower since the death of his wife in
1932, had fallen madly in love with a twenty-six-year-old typist,
Margarethe Gruhn, and asked for her hand in marriage. The
witnesses at the wedding? None other than Adolf Hitler and
Hermann Göring.30 While it is worth noting that there is no
evidence to suggest that Göring arranged the entire affair, his
ambitious and opportunistic mind was the first to realize the
potential for blackmail the moment a scandal erupted. Blomberg’s
new wife had once officially been registered as a prostitute by the
Berlin Police, and pornographic photos taken when she was
eighteen had recently passed into the hands of authorities. Photos
taken by her then roommate – who happened to be a Czech-Jewish
photographer.31 Von Blomberg had inadvertently brought the full
weight of the Nazi’s anti-Semitic zeitgeist down upon his head and
not even his personal relationship with Hitler could save him from
the firestorm of outrage that stood poised to destroy both his career
and the remaining shreds of the army's independence.
Göring’s motivations for attempting to destroy Blomberg
were two-fold. The first was purely political, as Blomberg’s
30
31

Kershaw, Hitler, 52.
Ibid., 53.
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demise potentially opened doors for the ultimate expansion of
Göring’s empire to encompass the entire military establishment.
The second was rather more personal; Blomberg had previously
led a charge in alliance with Schacht to dismantle Göring’s
economic empire. He proposed that the War Ministry should enjoy
exclusive control of rearmament policy and the maintenance of the
war economy in February of 1937, a proposal that went so far as to
suggest the complete elimination of Göring’s office in the event of
war.32 Thus the elimination of General von Blomberg represented a
victory across the board for Göring and he intrigued with Himmler
to present the scandal to Hitler, in order to usurp General
Blomberg’s office and establish himself as the Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces. Even if it meant trading away control
of the Four-Year Plan in exchange. Himmler for his part – an
equally ambitious schemer at heart – held onto a fantasy that he
would be able to seize the office and fold the army into his (then)
miniscule Schutzstaffel.33 Ultimately, Hitler was in no mood for
these machinations. Göring’s narcissistic ambition to expand his
political empire was blatantly obvious and Himmler's designs on
the position amounted to little more than an infantile delusion.
Hitler shot down both and instead opted to increase his own power
exponentially by taking the office for himself.34
Göring had failed to seize control of the military; but in the
process, he had inadvertently dealt a fatal blow to the
independence of the armed forces and significantly weakened the
hand of the traditional army conservatives. Ironically, while he had
personally lost the battle, he had simultaneously strengthened the
National Socialist revolution by crippling the military's traditional
political neutrality in the long term.35 It should be noted that there
is little evidence of any significant forethought on his part in this
gambit. It was an opportunistic event, and he simply groped
blindly in the dark through the Blomberg-Fritsch affair like
everyone else involved – Hitler included. Not to be discouraged by
his failure to achieve his personal goal, Göring set about to slowly
manufacture his own parallel military establishment over the next
four years, integrated within the Luftwaffe command structure and
independent of the army. In time, Hermann Göring created his own
32

Overy, Goering The 'Iron Man', 53.
Kershaw, Hitler, 57.
34
Ibid., 59.
35
Ibid., 60.
33
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private army composed of twenty-one infantry divisions and a
panzer division, which he characteristically named after himself,
for a total of a quarter million men under arms.36 In September of
1943, considering exceptionally poor performance of his Luftwaffe
Field Divisions, Hitler finally compelled Göring to turn his private
forces over to the army's operational control – though it remained a
somewhat separate organization until the end of the war and
Göring never ceased expanding it.

Joseph Goebbels – The Nationalist and Socialist
Demagogue
Germany gives in and sells out to the capitalist West.
A horrible prospect: Germany’s sons will bleed to
death on the battlefields of Europe as mercenaries of
capitalism. Perhaps, probably in a “holy war against
Moscow!” – Joseph Goebbels, personal diary,
1926.37
We shall win. We must win, and quickly. The public
mood is one of slight depression. The nation wants
peace, though not at the price of defeat, but every
new theatre of operations brings worry and concern.
– Joseph Goebbels, personal diary, June 23, 1941 –
one day after the invasion of the Soviet Union.38
I ask you: Do you want total war? If necessary, do
you want war more total and radical than anything
you can even imagine today? – Joseph Goebbels,
Sportpalast speech, February 18, 1943.39

36

Werner Haupt, Die deutschen Luftwaffen - Felddivisionen 1941-1945
(Eggolsheim: Dörfler Zeitgeschichte, 2005), 19.
37
Joseph Goebbels, The Early Goebbels Diaries: 1925-1926, ed. Helmut
Heiber, trans. Oliver Watson (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1962), 42.
38
Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries: 1939-1941, trans. and ed. by Fred
Taylor (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1983), 426.
39
Joseph Goebbels, “Nation, Rise Up, and Let the Storm Break Loose” (speech,
Berlin, February 18, 1943), trans. Randall Bytwerk, Calvin College, German
Propaganda Archive, http://research.calvin.edu/german-propagandaarchive/goeb36.htm.
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While Göring was still struggling to carve out a solid political
foothold, Joseph Goebbels was already hard at work engineering
his own miniature empire and doggedly pursuing the ideological
mission of the NSDAP as the architect of the party’s propaganda
machine and “conqueror” of “Red Berlin” during the late 1920s
and early ‘30s. Within the hierarchy of National Socialist
oligarchs, Goebbels forged his own personal empire to dominate
propaganda in the Reich and establish himself as the chief political
evangelist between party and nation. To properly understand the
true role and influence of the Reich’s most potent propagandist, it
is essential that we peel away the shroud of lies and half-truths
with which Goebbels clothed himself and identify the
revolutionary oligarch within. The task of the historian in this case
is to draw out the demagogue and trace his ideological evolution
from his political awakening, to his final days in the Führer
bunker.
For all his unbridled narcissism and talent for cynical
manipulation, Goebbels was not merely riding the coattails of the
revolution for his own political gain. While he was a deeply
ambitious, backstabbing opportunist, as we will soon see, in the
warped mind of Joseph Goebbels it was essential that he be exalted
as a great ideologue standing at the heart of a sweeping revolution.
His unchecked lust for praise and distinction demanded that he be
remembered as the man who wove the discordant voices of
National Socialism into one, coherent narrative united behind the
figure of his idol – Adolf Hitler.
Consequently, Joseph Goebbels devoted the first half of his
career to selling Nazism and the Führer cult to the German people,
and the latter half crusading to save the revolution. At his heart, he
was driven by racial theories, virulent anti-Semitism, and an
apocalyptic worldview. Ideologically speaking, Goebbels was the
perfect person to construct a National Socialist media empire; a
true believer, a skilled orator, and one of the most talented
manipulators within the NSDAP. Yet, even with the benefit of
seventy-years of hindsight, Goebbels is often remembered solely
for his tightly choreographed speeches and nigh unmatched
rhetorical prowess as head of the Ministry of Public Enlightenment
and Propaganda. His political agency and prime position within the
Third Reich's oligarchy has all too often been distilled into a
simplistic caricature of the man as Hitler's mouthpiece.
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All oligarchs of the Third Reich were heavily dependent on
Adolf Hitler as their political messiah and guarantor of their
personal empires. However, none were as personally reliant on
Hitler as Goebbels. As Peter Longerich has ably observed,
Goebbels was pathologically obsessed with both demonstrating his
own indispensability to the NSDAP movement and proving his
unconditional devotion to the Führer. In his mind, the two
objectives were indistinguishable from one another, and he went so
far as to consider his family to be Hitler's family as well.40
Goebbels’s total reliance on Hitler was arguably the most crucial
aspect of his personality and the most decisive influence upon his
career. However, by focusing too closely on his relationship to
Hitler, it is easy to lose sight of his own political agency as an
oligarch and his self-appointed crusade to preserve the revolution.
Much like his colleague Heinrich Himmler, Goebbels casts
a conflicted shadow across the historical stage. A talented orator
and brilliant propagandist, gifted with a sharp intellect on one hand
and a depressive, unstable narcissist never to be satisfied by any
amount of adulation or accolade on the other.
For Goebbels, the world truly was not enough. No amount
of praise could ever satisfy his narcissistic cravings. From his
earliest days of political awakening in 1924, Goebbels was fully
aware that he was a “demagogue of the worst sort,” but he did not
care.41 His chaotic personality demanded political agency and
constant reaffirmation of his own brilliance – both of which he
would later gain as the Minister of Public Enlightenment and
Propaganda. The only anchors amidst the hurricane within his
mind were the revolutionary mission of National Socialism and his
own self-enslavement to the will of his messiah.42
To grasp the contradictions and actions of Dr. Goebbels, it
is essential to understand that like his fellow oligarchs, Goebbels
saw himself as an indispensable component of the National
Socialist revolution. The decisive difference between Goebbels and
his colleagues lay in his peculiar relationship with Hitler. While his
rivals exalted Hitler as the founder of their political creed, each
40
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endeavored to carve out a domain within the Reich that was
uniquely his own. Goebbels on the other hand, sought to mix his
own godlike adoration for Hitler with his exceptional talents for
demagoguery and propaganda into a potent machine for statewide
indoctrination. Other oligarchs built their empires as franchises of
the revolution, Goebbels built his power base on selling Hitler to
the German people.
At the heart of Goebbels ideology lay a fanatical
commitment to the precepts of National Socialist revolution.
Despite his zealous attachment to the personality of Hitler during
his tenure as an oligarch, it should be noted that he came to
National Socialism through the left wing of the party under the
tutelage of Gregor Strasser – and originally shared his erstwhile
mentor’s disdain for the (more conservative) Munich branch
dominated by Hitler. Indeed, the early political beliefs of the then
National Socialist neophyte Joseph Goebbels were neatly
encapsulated by a party slogan he purposed in 1925, “First
salvation through socialism, followed like a whirlwind by national
liberation.”43 Nor should this be regarded as particularly
surprising; Goebbels hailed from a lower-class family and during
his political awakening avidly read the works of Marx and Engels,
Rosa Luxemburg, and SPD44 co-founder August Bebel.45
Given his predilection for socialist causes, complimented
by exceptional natural talent for oratory and manipulation,
Goebbels rapidly developed into the most potent attack dog of the
party’s left wing. Advocating confiscation of landed estates,
denigrating western capitalism, exalting socialism, and lionizing
the Soviet Union as a natural revolutionary role model for the
emerging NSDAP.46 Goebbels even went so far as to suggest that
Germany and Russia should join together as allies in the struggle
against the bourgeoisie order, else Germany’s only future would be
as “...mercenaries against Russia on the battlefields of
capitalism...in the last analysis better go down with Bolshevism
than live in eternal capitalist servitude.”47 Thus it followed, “That
43
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is why we place ourselves alongside Russia as equal partners in the
struggle for this freedom which means everything to us.”48
As far as the embryonic form of the Reich's future
propaganda minister was concerned, the Red Revolution in Russia
represented a natural precursor to the evolving National Socialist
movement in Germany. In Goebbels’ analysis, the critical flaw of
his Russian role model was their failure to address the “the Jewish
question” that he believed had derailed their industrial reforms and
hitherto retarded the development of a “truly nationalist and
socialist Russia.”49 Goebbels’ aggressive anti-Semitism had clearly
become intrinsically linked with his personal ideology and
permeated his judgment, long before his defection to the Munich
wing of the party.
Moreover, while Goebbels served the left wing of the
NSDAP and ideologically found himself at odds with much of
Hitler’s less aggressively revolutionary agenda, he rapidly became
enamored with the seemingly larger than life figure of Hitler.
Especially as the future Führer lavished him with praise and gifts
for his efforts to spread the party’s political creed.50 Easily swayed
by the approval of such a powerful man, the insatiably narcissistic
character of Goebbels increasingly explained away his doctrinal
disagreements as the work of the coterie of Munich ideologues
surrounding his newfound idol. Nor did he immediately realize that
Hitler was courting him for the Munich faction and actively
attempting to cleave him away from the Strassers – thus striking a
powerful blow against his primary opponents within the party.
Even on the eve of the fateful Bamberg party conference,51
Goebbels still genuinely believed that he could convert Hitler to
the Strasser’s worldview. “Our, i.e. the socialist, spirit is on the
march in all towns. Not a soul has faith in Munich. Elberfeld must
become the Mecca of German socialism.”52 The concept that his
political idol might genuinely hold very different opinions escaped
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him entirely, and he continued to believe that he could convert
Hitler to the left wing of the party despite mounting evidence to the
contrary.
Thus, when the crushing weight of reality finally descended
upon his shoulders on February 14, 1926, at the Bamberg
Conference, he was utterly unprepared for Hitler's frank exercise
of total dominion over the direction of the party. Hitler
systematically deconstructed the left-wing party platform –
denouncing Russia, calling for the destruction of Bolshevism,
advocating lebensraum, asserting his protection over landed
estates, and, in classic National Socialist style, attacked
Bolshevism as a Jewish plot. The assault left Goebbels shocked,
appalled, and lost without a political compass. For a man so certain
that the Munich wing was finished a mere week before, reality as
he knew it had just been called into question – and by a figure he
personally idolized no less. “Hitler speaks for two hours...What
kind of Hitler? A reactionary? Amazingly clumsy and
uncertain...Probably one of my greatest disappointments. I can no
longer believe in Hitler absolutely...I lost my inner support.”53
Never one to let reality deter him, Goebbels continued to delude
himself that the problem could not possibly be that Hitler’s
worldview differed so dramatically from his own, but rather it
must be the work of the treacherous Munich branch – “Kaufmann,
Strasser and I go to Hitler to impress on him: he must not allow
those rogues down there to tie him hand and foot.”54
As events unfolded, however, it was Goebbels, not Hitler,
who would experience a dramatic political conversion. Within just
two months, Goebbels brought his revolutionary socialism in line
with Hitler’s volkish collectivism. In reality, however, the shift was
not as dramatic as it may appear. Goebbels’ and Hitler’s
revolutionary objectives were quite similar at their core, both
sought total renovation of society and social leveling based upon
the concept of racial volksgemeinschaft.55 It was simply their
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proposed paths to this revolutionary objective that had differed so
radically.
Social question. Quite new perspectives. He has
thought it all out. His ideal: Blend of collectivism and
individualism. The land: all that is on it and below it
for the people. Production, individualistic
for
those who create. Combines, trusts, production of
finished articles, transport, etc. I am reassured all
round...With this sparkling mind he can be my
leader.56
Goebbels had now fallen in line with the Munich faction,
yet his revolutionary aspirations remained entirely undimmed as
his ideology began to morph into the persona of the fanatical
propagandist that has left an indelible mark on the history of both
the Reich, and of the world. As Goebbels’ idolization evolved, he
grew increasingly incapable of separating the person of Hitler from
the National Socialist revolution. In his mind, the two became one
in the same. With the zealous passion of a fresh convert, he set
about to proselytize his adoration for Hitler to the masses and set in
motion a series of events that would ultimately establish him as the
Reich's most prolific propagandist. Likewise, as the nation entered
the perpetual crisis of the Second World War, Goebbels’
revolutionary ideology continued to ceaselessly radicalize – as did
all things in the Reich. In the absence of the sweeping social
revolution that he and many other National Socialists had
envisioned, the chaos and destruction of war itself became his
engine of revolution. As the Reich burned to ashes around him,
Goebbels continued to press for more radical and revolutionary
solutions, including stricter control of the press, women in
industry, longer work hours, draconian conscription, and harsh
restrictions of public life – all with the goal of insuring that the
German people could never forget that they were “fighting for our
lives.”57 All of these proposals simultaneously expanded the scope
of Goebbels power by inserting himself into other pillars of the
state, while also contributing to the perpetual radicalization of the
Reich. Goebbels actively sought – and in many ways succeeded –
in establishing himself as one of the chief masterminds of wartime
56
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ideology in the Reich. He was a man who never hesitated to
propose a more radical solution and never failed to capitalize on
the political benefits.
However, in 1930, long before the crisis of the Second
World War, Goebbels had already begun to establish himself as the
NSDAP’s chief intercessor between Hitler, and the nation-at-large,
as the Gauleiter of Berlin.58 His aggressive campaign of mob
rallies, beer-hall brawls, and blatant agitation captured the
imagination of Berliners and the nation. Though many disapproved
of his firebrand agitation, Goebbels fully understood that any
publicity was good publicity.59 His efforts to keep both his own
name and the party’s ideology in the press achieved results
analogous to the triumph of social media in our own contemporary
politics. In essence, Joseph Goebbels asserted himself as the most
diabolically talented fake-newsman of his era. As Hugh TrevorRoper so pithily observed, Goebbels narratives were “utterly
unscrupulous in substance, and quite indifferent to truth.”60 Truly,
Goebbels would have reveled in Trevor-Roper’s assessment as his
chosen motto for his Berlin based Der Angriff newspaper was “no
information, just agitation.”61
Though he was still far from the apogee of his power,
Goebbels had firmly ensconced himself at the head of a
burgeoning private empire as Gauleiter of Berlin, chief of the
party’s national election campaign and master of its rapidly
evolving propaganda machine.62 The unification of the party’s
propaganda outlets in his hands served to bridge the gap between
the movement’s opposing middle and working class power bases.
On one hand, he pandered to the paranoia of political instability
and liquid times haunting the imagination of the middle classes
and, on the other, drew on his socialist background to formulate
aggressive attacks on the western capitalist system and bourgeois
society that he so despised. He unified these divergent narratives in
58
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the person of Hitler, whom he portrayed as a decisive, omnipotent
father figure sent to save the German volk. Although, in his
portrayal of Hitler, Goebbels was not particularly original – the
NSDAP had been built as a Führer party and he merely was
innovating pre-existing tactics.63 Furthermore, he catered to a
common Weimar-era yearning for a second Bismarck to deliver
the nation from insecurity. Even though the message was not
original, he rapidly established himself as the premier innovator of
Führer cult propaganda, in no small part because he believed the
essence of his own message. Goebbels saw Hitler as a messianic
savior or, to use his own words, “Half Plebian, half god!”64 He had
long since harbored a desire for a larger-than-life Bismarckian
statesman to lead the nation to salvation “O’ lord, give your
German people a miracle! A miracle!! A man!!! Bismarck,
arise!”65 Hitler was at the epicenter of his entire universe, and
Goebbels set about to create an all-encompassing propaganda
narrative to grant his veneration of Hitler center stage in the
emerging Reich.
Following the NSDAP’s 1933 electoral victory, Goebbels
found himself in a position of tremendous importance within the
Reich and beset by numerous enemies within the party who
regarded him – for good reason – as an ambitious and dangerous
schemer. However, with his ascension to head of the Ministry for
Propaganda and Public Enlightenment in March of 1933, followed
by the creation of the Reich Chamber of Culture under his
direction in September, he was suddenly and uniquely positioned
amongst the NSDAP’s budding oligarchs to influence the
population at large.
As he confided to his diary in August of 1932, “The
national education of the German people is being put in my hands.
I will master it.”66 And master it, he did. Goebbels’ efforts at the
head of the Propaganda Ministry pursued three broad objectives: to
transform domestic discourse in the Reich into an echo chamber of
his propaganda machine, to create the appearance of overwhelming
popular support for the movement through mass rallies as well as
‘spontaneous’ outrage against the enemies of the NSDAP and
finally to force intellectual opposition underground. He had created
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a closed system, wherein the clear majority of domestically
consumed information flowed forth from his labyrinthine
propaganda empire. Care should be taken, however, to avoid
implying that Goebbels thoroughly planned his takeover of the
media in advance. Rather, his media empire and construction of a
closed system naturally evolved from a combination of the party’s
Führer principle, his own insatiable need for constant gratification,
and the ever-present influence of working towards the Führer. Nor
was his control of the media entirely uncontested, as he
consistently faced competition from rival ministries and fellow
party ideologues, ranging from the Scuhtzstaffel’s own newspaper,
Das Schwarze Korps, to the Wehrmacht propaganda corps, Foreign
Ministry, Reich Ministry of Science, Education and Culture, and
others.67 Consequently, Goebbels’ Ministry brought him into
constant conflict with numerous competing propaganda narratives
within the state. However, none enjoyed the Reich spanning
breadth of Goebbels’ media empire and despite the competition, he
remained the chief spokesman of the party.
In his endeavors to ensconce his particularly potent form of
propaganda in daily civil discourse, Goebbels was wildly
successful. His national propaganda tactics relied heavily on
arousing a sense of national pride in the raw power and illusory
unity of the National Socialist movement, while animating primal
anger against those identified as enemies of the Reich, especially
Jews and communists. Yet, Goebbels was not concerned with
instilling a new, National Socialist moral compass on the German
volk, that remained the territory of Heinrich Himmler – as we shall
later see. Rather, he sought to mobilize basic emotions among the
population and use them to either reinforce popular support for the
regime or direct their anger against “outsiders” - who were in
many cases, their fellow citizens.68
In truth, Goebbels had simply enlarged the same successful
tactics he had employed in his “conquest” of Berlin to a national
scale, and the results were much the same. However, in his
capacity as the Reich’s propaganda oligarch, he also enjoyed
unprecedented agency to harass and silence his political opponents.
Empowered by his new office, Goebbels was free to fabricate
violent outbursts and then appear to act in response to popular
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demand. Thus lending his actions a false air of popular legitimacy.
This strategy would evolve into his signature political maneuver,
most infamously demonstrated during the massive attacks on
Germany’s Jewish populations during Reichskristallnacht in 1938.
Goebbels portrayed these attacks as “spontaneous” popular
reactions to the assassination of German diplomat Ernst vom Rath
in Paris by a disaffected Jewish exile, when in fact the pogroms of
Reichskristallnacht had been orchestrated or encouraged at his
behest by the NSDAP.
Mass violence was not the only tool of intellectual
repression in his arsenal. In his complimentary role at the head of
the Reich Chamber of Culture, Goebbels was ideally positioned to
firmly wrap the realm of culture in the tendrils of his expanding
personal empire by establishing himself as the chief censor in the
Reich. With regards cultural censorship, Goebbels's aspirations
reached far beyond agitation and pursued a far more actively
revolutionary goal, as demonstrated during his speech at the 1933
burning of the books at the Opernplatz in Berlin where he
declared:
The era of exaggerated Jewish intellectualism is now
at an end. The Triumph of the German revolution has
cleared a path for the German way...entrust to the
flames the intellectual garbage of the past. It is a
strong, great and symbolic undertaking...which shall
prove to all the world that the intellectual basis of the
November Republic is here overturned.69
As the burning of the books in 1933 quite clearly
demonstrated, Goebbels was willing and able to blend his penchant
for hate mongering with his revolutionary zeal. The burning of the
books accomplished three goals simultaneously. It conflated all
unorthodox intellectual thought with the NSDAP’s favorite
scapegoat – the mythical ‘Jewish conspiracy.’ It reminded
Germans that the era of Weimar liberalism and the Republic itself
was dead – replaced by the new revolutionary order of National
Socialism and served to publicly confirm his status as the chief
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censor. Goebbels followed up his aggressive censorship of ‘unGerman’ literature with a similar attack on unorthodox art during
the Degenerate Art Exhibition in September of 1937 and the
Degenerate Music Exhibition in 1938. Exhibitions that – like so
much of Goebbels’ career served several purposes at once – to
please Hitler above all else, but also to attack the Weimar period as
culturally degenerate in contrast to the supposed masculinity and
perfection of the new revolutionary order and finally to strike
blows against his competitors within the party.70 Each exhibition
served to solidify his political empire, whilst simultaneously
pursuing the goals of the revolution.
This layering of revolutionary zeal and narcissistic goals
lays at the very bedrock of Goebbels' success as an oligarch.
Though it was true as his longtime rival Rosenberg observed in
1939 “Dr. G. has no friends, no comrades,”71 Goebbels proved
himself perpetually incapable of completely falling from grace, his
fanatical personal devotion to Hitler and zealous commitment to
the revolutionary mission of National Socialism combined with his
innate predilection for intrigue guaranteed his survival – and
prosperity – as the Third Reich continued its relentless march into
the bottomless abyss of radicalization. As the strategic outlook of
the Reich grew bleak, Goebbels’ personal power continued to grow
exponentially.
The coming of the Second World War necessitated a
dramatic shift – and opportunity – for Goebbels as well as his
propaganda empire. In the aftermath of the swift triumphs over the
Western allies from September of 1939 to the end of Operation
Barbarossa in winter of 1941, the newly forged continental empire
seemed invincible. Yet, as the winter crisis of 1941 demonstrated,
the war with Russia was devolving into a protracted, bloody affair
with no swift end in sight. Nor had the United Kingdom
capitulated as hoped and the entry of the United States into the
war, when it came, added to the future uncertainty of the Reich’s
strategic situation. Though German defeat was by no means
guaranteed, it had become clear within Germany that the Second
World War – win or lose – would not end as quickly as it had
begun.
Consequently, Goebbels transitioned into the final stage of
his career – the preservation of the revolution by setting about to
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painstakingly regulate morale and war weariness within the
empire. Nothing was to be left to chance, optimistic reports that
could create delusions of a quick war were redacted and
suppressed alongside pessimistic “grumblers” who questioned the
capability of NSDAP leadership or the wisdom of the war effort
itself. Any action or statement that diverged from party sanctioned
morale standard could be interpreted as an existential threat to the
state by Goebbels’ expansive propaganda apparatus.72 His goal
became one of fostering a sense of apocalyptic desperation in the
German people – not simply to sew fear, but to create a feeling that
defeat in war amounted to the end of the German people. There
could be no 1918 style capitulation, no 1919 revolution, the defeat
of the Reich would mean “our national life would be completely
and totally destroyed.”73 After all, Goebbels was clearly privy to
the evolution of the Final Solution and confided to his journal in
March of 1943 that, “On the Jewish question, especially, we have
taken a position from which there is no escape. That is a good
thing. Experience teaches that a movement and a people who have
burned their bridges fight with much greater determination than
those who are still able to retreat.”74 The stakes were simply too
high to fail; thus, in order to preserve the revolution, Goebbels
made it his mission to manage the wartime attitude of the German
public by spoon feeding them his own positive spin on the
direction of the war effort and by resorting to exponentially more
radical and totalitarian means to maintain the dominion of the
NSDAP.
Such calculated manipulation of the home front was merely
the first step in Goebbels’ path to endless radicalization throughout
the war. When Göring began his meteoric decline in the aftermath
of his inability to bomb the United Kingdom out of the war or
defend the skies over Germany, and Hitler grew to detest the
nation’s traditional military leadership as inherently bourgeoisie,
Goebbels was ideally suited to fill the creeping power vacuum in
the Reich. His hands were 'clean' of the military reversals of 1942
and 1943. As the military situation grew bleak and Hitler withdrew
from the public eye to become absorbed with micromanaging
military matters, Goebbels increasingly stepped in to fill the public
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void left behind by the Führer’s growing domestic absence.75 As
he accurately identified – there was a “leadership crisis” within the
Reich and “the Führer is sometimes somewhat vacillating in his
decisions. He also doesn't always react correctly to people. A bit of
help is needed there.”76 Naturally, Goebbels viewed himself as the
ideal man to bridge this gap between Führer and volk, the man to
breathe new life in the revolution at its darkest hour and deliver it
from certain destruction through sheer force of will and persuasion
alone.77 With his customary talent for intrigue, Goebbels combined
his assumption of greater responsibility with a complimentary
expansion of his political empire to new heights.
His power would not remain relegated entirely to the
somewhat intangible world of propaganda. Starting in 1943, he
endeavored to form a political clique in alliance with Göring,
Speer, Ley, and Funk78 – with the objective of resurrecting the
Ministerial Council to free Hitler up for management of military
affairs. With Hitler free to micromanage the war effort, Goebbels
and his cohorts purposed to administer the daily governance of the
Reich through the Ministerial Council, chaired by Göring with
Goebbels serving as his deputy.79 Goebbels reasoned that “The
men who helped the Fuhrer win the revolution will now have to
help him win the war. They were not bureaucrats then; they must
not be bureaucrats today.”80 The critical flaw – among several – in
Goebbels’ planning, was that much like 1927, when he believed he
could “liberate” Hitler from the Munich branch of the NSDAP, he
assumed the heart of the problem lay in those around Hitler, the
bureaucracy in this case, and not in the person of Hitler himself.
Indeed, his messianic devotion to Hitler precluded him from
lucidly assessing that the leadership crisis in the Reich stemmed
from Hitler’s divide and rule leadership style that created a
revolutionary totalitarian oligarchy and enabled his lieutenants to
carve the Reich into so many rival internal empires. Hitler proved
75
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categorically opposed to real reform, as any significant change in
the power structure of the Reich posed a potential threat to the
reliance of all his subservient oligarchs on his personal blessing.81
Ironically, the same leadership style that allowed for the existence
of powerful miniature-führers like Goebbels in the first place had
become just as existential a threat to the state as the myriad of
foreign armies arrayed against it.
Regardless, the clique’s plans proved dead on arrival.
Hitler’s continued feud with Göring over the Luftwaffe’s inability
to defeat the overwhelming aerial campaign underway against the
Reich rendered any possibility of resurrecting the Ministerial
Council under his direction a moot point. The intrigue was
completely dead by September of 1943.82 Undeterred, Goebbels
continued to attempt to shift the weight of the leadership crisis
onto his shoulders and a subsequent effort by him to usurp the
foreign office and attempts to persuade Hitler to pursue a separate
peace with the Reich’s opponents also met with failure.83 It was
only in the aftermath of the July 20 assassination attempt that
Goebbels was finally able to tangibly expand his empire beyond
the realm of propaganda and culture following his appointment as
Plenipotentiary For Total War.
Ostensibly, the office of Plenipotentiary For Total War
granted Goebbels sweeping power to cut through bureaucratic red
tape and maximize available manpower reserves in a last-ditch
effort to reverse the increasingly hopeless military situation.84 Yet,
in reality, Goebbels’ newfound power was far less omnipotent than
he hoped; and, though he hailed his newly won office as “probably
the greatest success of my life,”85 he would soon fall afoul of the
same bureaucratic inertia and inherent party resistance to
significant reform that had catastrophically derailed all attempts to
rationalize the National Socialist state. Still, Goebbels fully
intended to use his new office to renovate governance of the Reich
according to his own conceptualization of the NSDAP’s
revolutionary mission as a means to combat the empire's declining
fortunes.
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At Goebbels’ direction, formerly conscription-exempt
manpower reserves wrapped up in the nation’s industrial base were
heavily raided, and the female conscription age for labor was
raised to fifty.86 Bureaucracies, and institutions deemed noncritical to the war effort, ranging from newspapers to technical
schools were summarily pruned or disbanded. Likewise, social
infrastructure, including the national postal, rail, taxation as well as
social security systems were streamlined – all in the name of
freeing up manpower for the war effort. Characteristically,
Goebbels was unable to resist proposing more radical solutions,
including the suspension of candy and beer production, as well as
the suspension of the delivery of private postal packages and
telegrams in an effort to combat the growing personnel deficiency
in the armed services.87 Each of these proposals was in turn shot
down by Hitler, meanwhile his efforts to use his new powers to
eliminate opposing forces within the bureaucracy – including the
office of the Prussian Prime Minister and the entire Reich's
Economics Ministry, unsurprisingly foundered on the rocks of
bureaucratic resistance.88
As the war dragged on through the balance of 1944 and
into the early months of 1945, it became increasingly obvious that
no amount of revolutionary zeal, no infusion of National Socialist
thought could right the sinking ship. Although, Goebbels assumed
the role of Plenipotentiary for Total War with high hopes and great
confidence in his own ability to preserve the revolution through
sheer force of will, the icy reality of conscription shortfalls and the
impending collapse of the National Socialist order loomed large on
the horizon. Goebbels’ personal empire had reached the zenith of
its breadth and power, but in light of the collapsing strategic
situation of the Reich, it seemed like a hollow achievement indeed.
His crusade to preserve the movement failed in no uncertain terms.
Never one to let the crushing weight of reality block his
path, the Reich's most senior propagandist prepared his exit in a
manner that would live on through history. In the warped mind of
Goebbels, if his idol was to take his life in the Führer bunker on
April 30, 1945, then Goebbels would follow the lead of his
messiah into the grave – even as his fellow oligarchs fled or
surrendered. Given Goebbels' peculiar brand of narcissism, his
86
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decision to (in his own eyes) martyr himself alongside his Führer is
entirely unsurprising. It would not be too much to contend that
Goebbels viewed himself as Peter to Hitler’s Jesus, the apostle
closest to his messiah who could provide counsel and guidance to
his ailing leader. In so doing, he believed he could help guide his
chosen prophet – and the movement itself to salvation, a salvation
that was toxic, destructive and utterly intolerant of opposing world
views.

Heinrich Himmler - The High Priest
Shall we, by filtering out the valuable blood through
a process of selection, once again succeed in training
and breeding a nation on a grand scale, a Nordic
nation?...We are called upon to establish foundations
so that the next generation can make history, and if
we create the right foundations it will be a great one.
– Heinrich Himmler, speech to SS leaders on “The
Purposes and Aims of the SS, the Relationship
between the SS, the SA and the Political
Formations,” June 13, 1931.89
By rooting our people in a deep ideological
awareness of ancestors and grandchildren we must
once more persuade them that they must have sons.
We can do a very great deal. But everything we do
must be justifiable vis-à-vis the clan, our ancestors.
If we do not secure this moral foundation which is
the deepest and best because [it is] the most natural,
we will not be able to overcome Christianity on this
plane and create the Germanic Reich which will be a
blessing for the earth. – Heinrich Himmler, Address
at the Funeral of Reinhard Heydrich, June 9, 1942.90
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The guideline for us in our struggle is neither the Old
or the New Testament in the Bible, but the political
testament of Adolf Hitler. – Heinrich Himmler,
1943.91
In contrast to the brash extravagance and bombastic personality of
Göring or the fiery rhetoric of Goebbels, the frail, timid, and
socially awkward Heinrich Himmler represented something of an
enigma both to colleagues and historians. Even senior NSDAP
officials found themselves perplexed as to how such a seemingly
apprehensive man had maneuvered into a position of great power,
and Armament Minister Albert Speer characterized him as “a
completely insignificant person, who in some inexplicable way has
risen to a prominent position.”92 Nor did his constant need to
expound (often tactlessly) on his racial theories win him many
friends, or, in the words of Hamburg NSDAP functionary Albert
Krebs, “such political rubbish served up in such a concentrated
form and that from a man who had been to university and who was
professionally engaged in politics.”93 Even his closest associates,
Heydrich and Hitler himself, often found themselves at wit’s end
with the whimsical fantasies that occupied Himmler’s mind.
In truth, Himmler represented a sort of sphinx amongst the
ranks of the Nazi oligarchs. A man possessed of sharp intellect,
and yet, simultaneously firmly detached from any semblance of
reality; a cunning mind for intrigue and diplomatic manipulation
on one hand, but truly socially inept on the other. Taken at face
value these contradictions have rendered Himmler entirely
impotent in the eyes of history, an irrelevant figurehead on the
sidelines of real power, but this view is wholly inaccurate. To
penetrate the smoke screen surrounding the Third Reich's most
enigmatic oligarch, it is essential to understand both his
motivations and warped personal ideology.
Heinrich Himmler was driven by absolute determination to
remake German society according to his vision of the “ideal”
Aryan volk and reorder the entire world along the lines of the
National Socialist biocracy. In his mind, his role was that of the
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master teacher and high priest of the National Socialist Revolution,
the man who would imbue future generations with the movement’s
revolutionary ideology and a new moral code, thereby insuring the
survival of the thousand-year Reich.
At the very core of Himmler’s world view and power, lay
the intertwined concepts of racial hierarchy, impending
apocalypse, and “blood and soil” Teutonic mysticism – a phrase
coined by his colleague Richard Darré.94 Himmler combined these
concepts to form the essential guiding principles of Schutzstaffel
indoctrination and the basis of his social engineering efforts. In
June of 1931 (two years after his ascension to Reichsführer-SS),
Himmler laid out his long-term objectives for the SS in a speech to
his senior officers: “The SS must become a force that includes the
best human material that we still possess in Germany. The SS must
be held together by a shared community of blood.”95 In Himmler’s
mind, the purpose of this shared community – bound by blood –
was to prepare Germany for the final battle between the Nordic
peoples and the nebulous forces of Bolshevism that haunted his
imagination. To Himmler, Bolshevism represented a worldwide
conspiracy against the German people, a plot by the enemies of the
Reich to destroy Nordic civilization as he understood it – as he
continued in his 1931 speech “But if Bolshevism is victorious then
this will mean the extermination of the Nordic race, of the last
valuable Nordic blood, and the devastation would mean the end of
the earth.”96
Himmler was preparing for a sort of National Socialist
Ragnarök, in which he would personally play a critical role by
laying the foundation for the final victory of the “Nordic” races
through the creation of a racially pure military community: 97
We have been given the greatest and most
magnificent task that a nation can be faced with. As
94
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far as the value of our blood and the numbers of our
population are concerned, we are dying out. We are
called upon to establish foundations so that the next
generation can make history, and if we create the
right foundations it will be a great one.98
It is precisely because of this psychotic whining that Himmler has
been so difficult for both historians and his contemporaries to take
seriously. However, the fact that Himmler perceived the world in
terms of racial hierarchies and truly believed in an impending
apocalypse represented the overriding guiding principle for his
entire career. Thusly, guided by insanity, fear and unbridled
ambition, Heinrich Himmler set off on a path that ultimately
enabled him to carve out the largest private empire of any oligarch
within the Third Reich – his very own Schutzstaffel state. An
organization so elaborate that before the end of the war, it had
inserted itself into every significant function of government, from
the battlefield to the maternity ward, owing to its colossal size and
special relationship to Hitler.
Throughout his career, Himmler consistently pursued his
vision of a race-based SS community to lay the aforementioned
‘right foundations’ for the coming apocalyptic struggle. New SS
applicants were examined for racial purity from the beginning, and
in 1931, examinations were extended to their wives and families
by the infamous “Engagement and Marriage Order.” Walther
Darré was brought in at the head of the SS Racial Office (the
future Race and Resettlement Main Office) to endlessly expound
on the ideals of blood and soil aristocracy, the necessity
resettlement of German populations eastwards and the future use
of breeding wardens to maintain Aryan purity in conquered lands,
for all time to come.99
Despite widespread derision, Himmler remained unswayed
from his campaign to assemble an SS community and in 1935
created the Lebensborn program in order to provide a human
production line for future generations of racially pure SS soldiers.
As Himmler explained in 1936, he anticipated “200-300 children
per year from every battalion of the Verfügungstruppe...and make
them soldiers and officers or, alternatively superior wives of our
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nation”100 It was a truly ambitious eugenics program by any stretch
of the imagination. Young women within the program were
boarded at SS owned facilities, cared for to the fullest capacity of
the state, and any child born at a Lebensborn facility could become
a ward of the program, a measure designed to be particularly
enticing to single mothers to whom traditional stigmas surrounding
unwed motherhood could prove devastating. However, as tempting
as it may be to disregard the Lebensborn program a system of state
sponsored brothels, any such assertion is a sensationalist
overstatement. Above all else, Lebensborn existed as the ultimate
expression of Himmler’s vision of the SS as a community, and its
services extended to provide welfare for the married spouses of SS
personnel and an adoption service for unwanted children from the
general public – provided the parents were judged racially pure.101
However, Himmler’s ambitions were not limited to merely
ensuring future racial purity. He also entertained a deep-seated
desire to excise what he saw as the un-German cultural influence
of Christianity by replacing it with a new religious order based
upon National Socialism. “The guideline for us in our struggle is
neither the Old or the New Testament in the Bible, but the political
testament of Adolf Hitler.”102 Himmler saw the principles of
Christianity as a stifling foreign influence that would ultimately
have to be eradicated to make way for “proper religion and
morality” based on ancestral folk heroes and the modern Führer
principle, a truly schizophrenic combination. However, despite
Himmler’s attempts to instill a new National Socialist creed on
German society through his intercessionaries within the SS, his
“messiah” remained unimpressed:
What nonsense! We have finally arrived in an era
which has dispensed with all mysticism, and now
he’s starting at the beginning again. We might as well
have stayed with the church. To think I might one
day be made an SS saint. Just imagine it! I would turn
over in my grave.103
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Despite his frenzied rhetoric and grandiose designs, in 1931
Himmler and his SS were in no position to dictate anything to
anyone. He was for all practical intents and purposes, the head of a
glorified bodyguard service tasked with ensuring the safety of
leading NSDAP officials; moreover, the microscopic SS existed
only as a subordinate wing of the SA. But opportunity lay just
around the corner and Himmler was not one to miss it, he had
already begun to distinguish the SS as an “elite” organization
within the SA, committed to discipline, racial/moral purity, and
unquestioning loyalty to Hitler.104 Meanwhile as the Nazi Party
began its final ascent to power after the arduous setbacks of 1932,
the party establishment found it increasingly difficult to control the
behavior of Ernst Röhm's Sturmabteilung (SA).105 The use of street
terror had served to remind the populace that the NSDAP was a
serious political organization, but the SA’s small regard for
Hitler’s legal approach to destroy democracy from within by
mobilizing its own tools against it was now a problem. The SA
demanded immediate revolution to overthrow the state and remake
the entire nation in the image of National Socialism and even after
Hitler ascended to the chancellery, Ernst Röhm and his associates
continued to agitate for a “second revolution.”106 As tensions
between the party and the SA continued to simmer, Himmler stood
to gain a great deal from the ensuing chaos. Party officials across
the country lived in fear of the SA – especially recently established
NSDAP state governors who felt particularly vulnerable. Himmler
found himself in a unique position to provide an insurance policy
against the SA’s revolutionary ambition, for he was solidifying a
monopoly on the most potent weapon in the Reich – repression.107

104

Longerich, Heinrich Himmler, 118-121.
The Sturmabteilung or SA was the paramilitary wing of the Nazi Party. The
organization was simultaneously renowned and infamous in party circles for its
brutality, revolutionary zeal, rebellious nature and penchant for random acts of
violence – both sanctioned and unsanctioned. The SA’s extraordinary size –
some several million members composed of numerous, often loosely controlled
regional commands – made the organization notoriously difficult to control.
Ultimately, the SA was decapitated and reduced to political insignificance
during the 1934 Night of the Long Knives purge. Conan Fischer, “Ernst Julius
Röhm: Chief of Staff of the SA and Indispensable Outsider,” in The Nazi Elite,
ed. Ronald Smelser and Rainer Zitelmann (New York: New York University
Press, 1993), 178.
106
Longerich, Heinrich Himmler, 156.
107
Ibid., 156, 158.
105

148

Athahn Steinback

As early as the summer of 1931, Himmler had already
begun to ensconce the SS in the world of internal security with the
formation of an independent SS Intelligence agency that eventually
evolved into the dreaded Sicherheitsdienst (SD) under the highly
efficient (and brutal) leadership of fellow oligarch Reinhard
Heydrich.108 However, Himmler’s power was still restricted to
internal security within the party and his subordination to the SA
limited his capacity for independent action. Himmler, the
burgeoning oligarch, needed to be able to assert his power in an
entirely separate domain, apart from the gargantuan SA and
ultimately his great break would come in Bavaria after Hitler’s rise
to power in 1933. On March 9, 1933, Himmler was appointed as
Chief of the Munich Police with Heydrich acting as his right-hand
man at the head of Department VI – the political police.109 This
gave Himmler an opportunity to successfully assert his
independence. Small as his new post may seem in retrospect, he
was no longer merely the head of a glorified bodyguard service,
sporting an awkwardly bolted on intelligence wing. He was now a
political actor possessing very real agency, and nothing could have
prepared the nation for the cold and calculated apparatus of terror
he was about to engineer.
Himmler acted quickly and decisively to secure his new
position; Communist party members, non-Nazi paramilitaries and
trade unionists were arrested en-masse under the fig leaf of
“protective custody.” Dissidence within Munich was quelled
instantaneously and his efficiency was swiftly rewarded. On April
1st, he was promoted to Commander of the Bavarian Political
Police, placing him at the helm of both Bavaria's statewide
political police and its growing array of concentration camps.110
Himmler wasted no time in subordinating both to his SS hierarchy.
Within months, the Schutzstaffel became synonymous with
protective custody, sadistic punishment, and systematic terror
carried to the German people through Himmler's sinister emissary
– Dachau.111
Himmler was no mere regional police chief; he had become
the head of the thought police, and he wanted everyone to know it
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– “We are brave enough to be unpopular, we are brave enough to
be hard-hearted and unfeeling!”112 The means of repression were
gradually falling into the Reichsführer’s hands. Within one year
the political police of every German state – save Prussia – had
fallen under Himmler’s control, and armed SS detachments had
been permanently garrisoned across the nation as political dissent
quick reaction detachments.113 Himmler had been unleashed. He
would soon be in a position to act on his apocalyptic fantasies and
attempt to make his visions of “German samurai” and an SS
community based on blood a terrifying reality.114 The Schutzstaffel
empire took flight.
Meanwhile, as Himmler extended the tendrils of the SS
across Germany, the clock was ticking for Röhm and his SA.
Göring grew suspicious of Röhm’s revolutionary ambitions and
Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick (still futilely attempting to
moderate the excesses of the NSDAP) – tired of their random acts
of violence. The German people lived in fear of their wrath and
Himmler saw an opportunity to usurp the power of his friend and
former mentor, Ernst Röhm. Thus, the elimination of Röhm and
the consequent emasculation of SA leadership opened numerous
doors for the up and coming Reichsführer. First and foremost, it
lent Himmler an opportunity to prove his unconditional loyalty to
Hitler while simultaneously establishing the Schutzstaffel’s formal
independence from the SA. Furthermore, Röhm's demise at the
hands of SS executioners served as a grim reminder to the Nazi
hierarchy that if they incurred Hitler’s wrath, they would answer to
the SS. There would be no tolerance for dissent, no matter how
senior or popular the dissenter – no one was ever beyond the reach
of the Schutzstaffel’s reign of terror. If the SS could liquidate
Röhm without repercussion, they could liquidate anyone so long as
the Führer sanctioned it.
Most pressingly, Himmler’s personal empire was no longer
fettered by any external authority – save Hitler, to whom he
remained sycophantically loyal until the very end. Himmler acted
quickly to expand his power base; in the immediate aftermath of
the Night of the Long Knives, pre-existing SS bodyguard
detachments were gradually organized into front line military
formations under the banner of the SS-VT (SS-Verfügungstruppe,
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later Waffen-SS). Likewise, the concentration camp guards were
invested into the SS-TV (SS-Totenkopfwerbände), which
ultimately evolved into the umbrella organization for all
concentration and extermination camp guards within the Reich.115
Though both organizations were still in their infancy, Himmler had
laid the groundwork both for his private army and for continued
monopoly over the camps, the Reich’s most potent instrument of
repression.
However, much like Göring’s future efforts to establish an
independent Luftwaffe army, Himmler met immediate resistance
from Germany’s traditional military establishment who saw the
emerging SS-VT as yet another threat to the armed forces role as
the nation's sole bearer of arms and a mere re-run of Röhm’s
threats to replace the army with a “people's militia.” In this regard
the army elites were absolutely correct, the difference was that
unlike Röhm, Himmler enjoyed Hitler’s support and the nascent
Verfügungstruppe continued to expand its ranks, equipment and
officer corps, despite army opposition. In 1938, following the
decisive defeat of the army's independence in the aftermath of the
Blomberg-Fritsch affair, Hitler finally interceded to end the SSWehrmacht feud. The Allgemeine-SS (General SS) was restricted
to internal policing and party activities during peacetime.
However, a critical caveat was created through which Himmler
engineered the Waffen-SS, the Verfügungstruppe was affirmed as
“neither a part of the Wehrmacht nor part of the Police. It is a
standing armed unit exclusively at my disposal”116
The outbreak of World War II opened the door to a
virtually unlimited expansion of both the Schutzstaffel and
Himmler’s personal power base. Right up until the surrender of the
Third Reich, Himmler’s grip expanded on all fronts. The massive
expansion of the SS repression system over conquered territories
by the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) under Heydrich spread
the National Socialist reign of terror to the furthest corners of the
continent. While the swelling ranks of the SS-Totenkopfwerbände
ultimately made the expansion of the concentration camp system
eastwards and subsequent creation of the death camps possible.
However, the most direct expansion of SS power manifest itself
within the Waffen-SS, formed out of the SS-Verfügungstruppe in
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1940. By the war’s end, the Waffen-SS had grown from an initial
establishment of roughly 28,000 men to a breathtaking size of
thirty-eight divisions and just over a million men had served in its
ranks.117 By the beginning of 1944, despite its entire size equating
to a mere five percent of the Wehrmacht, the Waffen-SS controlled
roughly twenty-five percent of the nation’s armored divisions and
thirty-three percent of its mechanized divisions and received the
newest equipment before the vast majority of the army.118 The
Waffen-SS had established military prominence far beyond its
comparative size. Furthermore, all major combatant foreign
military formations in the Reich were either controlled by or
transferred to Waffen-SS command, and Waffen-SS personnel
were drawn from volksdeutsche from every corner of the Germanic
world, Holland, Norway, Finland, France, Hungary and the Baltic
states just to name a handful.
Additional auxiliary SS units were raised from non-Aryan
populations. Himmler acquired personnel from nearly every
occupied region and subject population within the Reich, ranging
from Bosnian Muslims to Ukrainians.119 The conditions of service
and willing participation of these so-called “Hiwis” (volunteers)
from non-German populations was always suspect, and Himmler
went to great lengths to differentiate foreign soldiers from their
German superiors; the “term SS man, which means so much to us
and which we regard so highly” did not apply to “the numerous
members of alien ethnic groups which we are now organizing
under command of the SS.”120 Himmler clearly did not envision
his “alien” personnel as his equals; indeed, their employment
echoes of the SS-TV’s parallel use of foreign populations in the
execution of the Final Solution. They were merely intended to
serve as the serf-soldiers of the coming thousand-year Reich and
nothing more.
By the fall of the Third Reich in May of 1945, Himmler’s
empire had reached truly fevered heights. What had begun as a
party bodyguard agency of no exceptional note when Himmler
assumed control of the SS in 1929, had evolved into the single
most defining institution of the Third Reich. As the war dragged on
and the worldview of German leadership became increasingly
117
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detached from the situation at the front and descended further and
further into a self-radicalizing tailspin, the power of Himmler and
the SS grew exponentially. On the battlefield, every defeat suffered
at the hands of Germany’s enemies caused Hitler and the Nazi
leadership around him to increasingly despise the traditional army
elites upon whom the prosecution of the NSDAP’s war largely
rested. Instead of considering the leadership failures of the Führer
and others that had created such an untenable strategic situation,
Hitler and his cohorts simply entertained increasingly deranged
conspiracy theories and admonished the traditional Wehrmacht for
lacking proper revolutionary National Socialist consciousness:
In the absence of an elite as we envisaged it, we had
to make do with the human material to hand. And this
is the result! Because the intellectual concept could
not be wedded to a practical and practicable
implementation of the idea, the war policy of a
revolutionary state like the Third Reich necessarily
became the policy of reactionary bourgeois.121
In the midst of it all, there was one man who promised
Hitler both an “elite as we envisaged” and total devotion to the
revolutionary principles of the NSDAP – and that man was
Heinrich Himmler. Paradoxically, much like his colleague
Goebbels, the Reich's decline was the key to Himmler’s success in
transforming the SS from a glorified bodyguard service into a
continent spanning internal empire. As the political life of the
Third Reich – and particularly the political outlook of Hitler
himself ran further off the rails of the remotest sense of normality
and reality – Himmler’s power grew incalculably. His central role
in the direction of policy and ideology within the Third Reich has
often been overlooked, relegated to the sidelines of history and
dismissed as the ravings of a madman. Mad as he may have been,
it is nigh impossible to imagine the Third Reich without the SS, the
SS that Himmler built. The only individual in the entire Reich with
a more dramatic impact than Heinrich Himmler was Hitler himself.
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Reinhard Heydrich - The Revolutionary Purifier
Ideological enemies can only be subjugated in a
spiritual battle of world-views. After the first months
of the revolutionary conquest of state power, coordination began to be undertaken. When some of
our fellow combatants did not endorse the
importance of this change in the form and means of
battle, the term ‘from revolution to evolution’ was
coined, i.e. from external seizure of power to the
spiritual and ideological conquest of everybody. –
Reinhard Heydrich, Transformations in Our
Struggle, 1935.122
It is almost too hard for one person, but we have to
be as hard as granite, otherwise the work of our
Führer will be destroyed. In the distant future, they
will thank us for what we have taken upon ourselves.
– Reinhard Heydrich, speaking to a League of
Nations Commissioner, 1937.123
Educate our children to become firm believers in the
Führer and Germany; to be true to the ideas of the
Nazi movement. [Make sure] that they strictly adhere
to the eternal laws of the SS, that they are hard
toward themselves, kind and generous towards our
own people and Germany and merciless towards all
internal and external enemies of the Reich.
– Reinhard Heydrich, letter to his wife to be
delivered in the event of his death, September 1,
1939.124
Though Himmler’s empire building achievements were numerous,
he had by no means done it alone. He had, like all other Nazi
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oligarchs, relied heavily on the Führer, but most pressingly he also
enjoyed the cooperation of the man destined to become the most
feared official in the Reich – Reinhard Heydrich. The character of
Heydrich – much like Himmler, has been the subject of a great
degree of historical hyperbole. Wild claims about his mythical
Jewish heritage or supposed efforts to assassinate Hitler were
accepted as canonical for many decades, and efforts to seriously
decode the man’s motivations and worldview have been clouded
by such sensational claims. As usual, reality is far more complex.
The character of Reinhard Heydrich has been ably described by
German historian Günther Deschner, “If National Socialism had
looked into a mirror, Reinhard Heydrich would have looked back
out of it.”125 Deschner’s observation is absolutely correct.
Heydrich was not merely a two-dimensional careerist driven by
ambition alone, nor was he driven by a fractured and self-loathing
personality to pursue greater and greater power.126 Great ambition
certainly helped Heydrich along his path, and the loss of his
kriegsmarine career did push him firmly into the National Socialist
camp, but Heydrich’s conversion to the National Socialism was
genuine and his devotion to Himmler's Schutzstaffel worldview,
absolute. Reinhard Heydrich was to become the ideological
“purifier” for the National Socialist revolution, a man who truly
believed in the aims of the NSDAP and prepared to take any and
all steps he deemed necessary in pursuit of its goals. Heydrich was
the malevolent Lancelot to Hitler/Himmler’s King Arthur.
To properly grasp Heydrich’s role within the state as chief
security oligarch, it is important to understand the nature of his
relationship to his titular superior – Himmler. The two men
possessed radically different personalities. Himmler viewed
himself as the ideological architect of a new world order and
Heydrich as the cold, rational hammer with which his new order
would be forged. To those around them, it often seemed as though
the pair were in a constant state of disagreement, when Heydrich
poured scorn on Himmler’s flights of fantasy Himmler in turn
retaliated like a helpless schoolmaster berated by his student;
“You...and your logic. We never hear about anything but your
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logic. Everything I propose you batter down with your logic. I'm
fed up with you and your cold rational criticism.”127
Arguments such as this have often been used as evidence
for some kind of irreconcilable rift between the Heydrich and
Himmler, but this is merely misreading of the relationship. Indeed,
Heydrich was not impressed by Himmler’s flights of fancy, but it
did not represent an insurmountable stumbling block between
them. Heydrich valued practicality and efficiency above all else
and part of his role as Himmler’s de-facto second man was to
provide cold, hard logic as a counterbalance to Himmler’s mystical
delusions. Until Heydrich’s death, the pair enjoyed a collaborative
relationship as two powerful oligarchs in pursuit of a common goal
– the realization of the SS state and the fabrication of a National
Socialist world order.128 From the day Heydrich joined the SS, on
July 14, 1931, until his death in June of 1942, Himmler remained
Heydrich’s ideological mentor and chief ally within the Nazi party,
two sides of the same coin at the very heart of National
Socialism.129
Heydrich’s primary roles within the Third Reich were twofold. His official role as the head of party intelligence – later
expanded to the empire-wide Reich Main Security Office – and his
self-appointed role as the purifier of the revolution, to be discussed
in greater detail later. Heydrich’s ascent within the SS security
apparatus began by historical happenstance, in 1931, when
Himmler formed the Ic-Dienst (future SD) – he had been
mistakenly informed that Heydrich had been an intelligence
officer. In reality, Heydrich had merely been a communication
officer. Regardless, armed with his intellect, an understanding of
spy craft from espionage novels and twenty minutes, Heydrich had
fleshed out a convincing sketch for the future structure of a party
intelligence agency – at least, convincing enough for Himmler to
hire him on the spot.130
Initially, Heydrich’s new role was nothing particularly
glamorous. The SD was not yet feared – though it would be soon –
and the SS state that it would serve did not yet exist. In 1931, the
SS was, as has already been mentioned, little more than a
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bodyguard service headed by an unusually ambitious Reichsführer.
Regardless, Heydrich devoted himself completely to his new post
despite crippling material and personnel shortages. During its
formative years between 1931 and 1934, Heydrich’s SD benefited
greatly from general paranoia and fear of ideological opponents
within the movement – especially real and imagined links between
the SA and disgraced Strasser brothers.131 Yet, despite accusations
in the press that he was founding “a Fascist Cheka” as early as
1931,132 Heydrich’s nascent SD remained miniscule, overworked,
and lacking respect within the party. In 1932, the SD consisted of
paltry thirty-three full-time employees to cover the entire NSDAP
establishment.133 Nonetheless, Heydrich forged ahead and when
Himmler was finally gained real power in Munich in 1933,
Heydrich’s meteoric rise followed that of his mentor. As Himmler
consolidated his SS grip on political police across the Reich,
Heydrich integrated the newly acquired political police forces into
his SD, assembling a nationwide information network that
constantly fed intelligence from every corner of the Reich directly
to his office.134 Heydrich’s ascendancy as the Third Reich’s
dreaded security oligarch was about to begin.
Unsurprisingly, the rise of Heydrich’s personal empire was
– just like the rest of the SS – closely tied to the decline of the SA.
For many years, Himmler, Heydrich, and Röhm had been close
friends, fellow National Socialists, and true believers; Röhm was
even the godfather to Heydrich’s eldest son.135 Yet, ambition and
the oligarchic nature of the newly established National Socialist
regime had begun to seriously undermine relations between
Himmler/Heydrich and Röhm as the NSDAP finally obtained real
power in the aftermath of their 1933 electoral victory. Röhm
openly called for a second revolution, while party leadership
entrenched around Hitler clearly understood that their hold on the
nation was far too tenuous and their “legal approach” far too
successful to be gambled away on a whim.
Röhm’s dissent posed both a serious threat and an
irresistible opportunity. With the SS rapidly gaining control over
the nation’s political police, the random acts of violence and
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retribution perpetrated by individual SA members simply could no
longer be tolerated by the Himmler/Heydrich duo. The tools of
state repression belonged to them, and they could brook no
competition. Moreover, Röhm’s ambition to replace the army with
a National Socialist people’s militia posed a direct challenge to
Himmler's long term objectives for the SS. However, of more
immediate concern, Röhm's bellicose rhetoric directly challenged
the Führer’s will.136 Open dissent would not be tolerated –
especially from the head of the SA that had been so critical to the
success of the revolution. The board was set for a show down
between the SA and the party establishment, Heydrich and
Himmler were quick to realize that their interests would be well
served by disposing of their old friend.
Heydrich’s role in the suppression of the SA and
destruction of Röhm was complex. He was both the party’s
executioner, responsible for eliminating Röhm and his
confederates and, simultaneously manager of the whisper
campaign to justify his elimination.137 Röhm had already placed
himself in a precarious position, but he was still shielded by his
impeccable National Socialist credentials and by the immense size
of his SA. But as the master of party intelligence, Heydrich was
well positioned to weave the narrative of a putsch plot between
Röhm, former Chancellor von Schleicher, Gregor Strasser, and the
French Republic.138 A mere three days before the purge, Heydrich
informed his subordinates about the imminent danger of “Röhm’s
connections to France and the involvement of other forces hostile
to the state” including “the communists” and “reactionary
circles.”139 It was a convenient conspiracy, including Heydrich's
least favorite things – foreigners, communists, and reactionary
bourgeoisie. Whether Heydrich cynically fabricated this narrative
to meet the needs of his superiors, or contorted his mind into
believing that Röhm presented an imminent threat to the National
Socialist state remains hotly debated. It is certainly easy to see
Heydrich as the master blackmailer and forager that he was,
fabricating the narrative for the elimination of his opponents.140
Nevertheless, it is just as easy to see Heydrich, the paranoid
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xenophobe finding conspiracies where, indeed there were none.
Regardless of Heydrich’s agency in planning the purge, his
primacy as the instrument of purification is beyond question. The
National Socialist Lancelot was in his element.
When the order to liquidate Röhm and his compatriots
came down from Hitler on June 30, 1934, Heydrich acted swiftly
and efficiently. The SD had been elevated to the sole party
intelligence agency on June 6th by Hitler himself, and all party
officials had been required by secret decree to supply the SD with
any and all information it deemed necessary.141 By the beginning
of the Night of the Long Knives, the SD had already prepared lists
of political opponents earmarked for elimination, including
conservative politicians and in classic Heydrich style, he also used
the opportunity to employ his recently acquired Gestapo against
personal opponents as well – particularly from the politically
activist Catholic right that he so emphatically despised.142
The purge not only consolidated the regime’s grip on the
state, it also served as a particularly potent warning to every citizen
of the Reich that the new prince of terror was both willing and able
to execute political dissidents out of hand, although, unbeknownst
to the general public – Hitler berated Heydrich's Gestapo for the
unnecessarily public ways in which some of the victims had been
disposed of.143 Hitler's public relations objections aside,
Heydrich’s role as the sword of fate in the Röhm purge firmly
cemented his position as a senior oligarch in the NSDAP
hierarchy. Within a month, he had already begun a whisper
campaign alleging among other things that General von Fritsch
was planning a putsch against Hitler and collecting the baseless
accusations of a notorious male Berlin prostitute and blackmailer
targeting the General. Though the Führer would have none of it
and ordered the Fritsch files destroyed – an order that Heydrich
conveniently neglected to carry out – it returned to haunt von
Fritsch four years later amidst the Blomberg-Fritsch affair.144
Nonetheless, Heydrich had spread his wings as the unchallenged
security oligarch and like the other great men of the National
Socialist state, immediately set about to insert himself uninvited
into all other aspects of the state.
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Following the Röhm purge in 1934, Heydrich’s power
exploded, both in conjunction with Himmler and on his own
accord. Heydrich expanded the scope of SD operations far beyond
the borders of Germany and began to actively recruit personnel for
foreign deployments. This new expansion of the SD program was
in direct contravention of his pre-existing “Ten Commandments”
agreement with Abwehr (military intelligence) limiting the SD to
internal intelligence and leaving foreign affairs firmly in the
domain of Admiral Canaris and Abwehr, not that Heydrich
particularly cared.145 He was just taking a standard page from his
fellow oligarchs by building a National Socialist clone of an
established institution and gradually usurping its role entirely, the
same strategy used by Göring against the Finance Ministry and the
same strategy Himmler was already planning for his SSVerfügungstruppe against the venerable German army.
In July of the same year, Himmler and Heydrich jointly
conspired to use SS-Standarte 89 (based in Vienna) to mount a
putsch in the Austrian capital, decapitate the fascist Vaterländische
Front government and achieve Anschluss in 1934.146 The plot
rapidly morphed into a catastrophe, the putsch failed, Mussolini –
then a close ally of Austria – was enraged, the international press
was mortified by the assassination of the Austrian Chancellor and
Hitler was forced to disown the Austrian National Socialists to
avoid a public relations nightmare. For his part, Heydrich was not
discouraged by this setback and continued to methodically expand
his intelligence apparatus both inside the Reich and beyond its
borders for the duration of his lifetime.
In late September 1939, a little under a month after the
outbreak of World War Two, Heydrich rose to the head of the
Reich Main Security Office (RSHA); a security apparatus rivaled
in the Herculean scope of its mission only by Stalin’s NKVD. As
the head of the RSHA Heydrich played a critical dual role, both as
an oligarch at the head of his own security empire based upon the
National Socialist Führer principle and as the decisive wing of
Himmler's SS-state.147 Without Heydrich's RSHA, Himmler’s
plans for his racially pure SS-community could not be exported
beyond the borders of the Reich and his dreams of a blood and soil
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aristocracy could not be realized without the cold, efficient engine
of terror that Heydrich had manufactured for him. Heydrich made
it possible to export the Aryan worldview – by coercion – across
the entire continent and in so doing, laid the groundwork for the
most infamous atrocities of the Nazi regime, including the brutal
suppression of conquered nations, the mass deportation of Jewish
populations, the Einsatzgruppen, and finally, the systematic
extermination of millions.
The twisted talents and achievements of Reinhard Heydrich
have been well documented and assessed over the years, yet the
question remains. What motivated Heydrich to develop such an
extensive and potent security apparatus and to so doggedly pursue
all enemies of the Reich – both real and imagined? Was it
insatiable ambition? Unbridled paranoia or a shattered, restless
personality? The truth, of course, is far more complex than a single
generalized character trait. To properly understand the motivations
and actions of Reinhard Heydrich, it is necessary to revisit the
principle of the National Socialist Lancelot, the man who
embodied the “manifestation of the SS state like no other”148
Like other leading Nazis, Heydrich viewed National
Socialism as a revolutionary mission, however, unlike most Nazis,
he fit its portrait for “perfection” flawlessly and viewed himself as
the self-appointed purifier of the NSDAP’s revolutionary mission.
Heydrich was tall, blonde, blue-eyed, viewed the world through
racial hierarchies and preferred a technocratic approach to solving
problems.149 Moral quandaries did not trouble him and like his
ideological mentor Himmler, he viewed ethical qualms as a sign of
weakness to be brushed aside in pursuit of a higher goal.
Heydrich's worldview was best summed up in his comments
regarding the early concentration camps to Swiss diplomat Carl
Jacob Burkhardt in the late 1930s – “It is almost too hard for one
person, but we have to be as hard as granite, otherwise the work of
our Führer will be destroyed. In the distant future, they will thank
us for what we have taken upon ourselves.”150 And thus he took it
upon himself to cleanse the National Socialist Revolution of all
impurities, both racial and practical, to ensure that the
revolutionary mission would go on so that the promised thousandyear Reich could be born. In Heydrich’s mind, his actions would
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ensure a “link between the illustrious cultural past of our people
and the coming thousands of years of German national history.”151
Heydrich was adamant from his earliest days in the movement – at
least after his appointment to the nascent SD – that National
Socialism was beset on all sides by amorphous conspiracies, plots
and enemies disguised in all corners of society.152 Jews,
Freemasons, Catholics, Marxists – anything with the remotest hint
of internationalism or affinity for foreign culture was fair game for
Heydrich’s labyrinthine conspiracy theories. They were all to be
surveilled, subdued, and if necessary, eliminated.
In Heydrich’s worldview, it was essential that he be
granted total independence from established law and categorically
dismissed the concept of inviolable rights in pursuit of the enemies
(reichsfiende) that threatened the coming thousand-year Reich.
In order to preserve our people, we must be harsh in
the face of our enemy, even at the cost of hurting an
individual or being condemned as rabblerousers...Should we not fulfill our historical role as
National Socialists because we have been too
humane and objective, there will be no mitigating
circumstances when our conduct is being evaluated.
It will merely be said: they have not fulfilled their
role when facing history.153
To students of history familiar with purges in revolutionary
Leninist and later Stalinist Russia, this language might strike the
reader as chillingly familiar. It is the language of a revolutionary
executioner, a latter-day Robespierre.154 Heydrich’s agency in the
Röhm purge was by far the most visible episode of his ideological
crusade within the movement, but it was far from the only one. In
1935, as his personal empire branched out across the Reich,
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Heydrich furnished himself with a bully pulpit from which to
bludgeon his political enemies – at home and abroad. He proposed
to Himmler that the SS should possess its own tabloid inspired by
the lurid success of Julius Streicher’s Der Stürmer.155 Unlike
Streicher, Heydrich’s goal was not merely to provoke outrage and
mobilize the party’s radical base against the enemies of National
Socialism. Instead, he viewed it as a precise tool of political
indoctrination, purification, and his own personal soap-box from
which to lambast his fellow National Socialists and ideological
opponents alike. Thus, Das Schwarze Korps was born and no one,
save Himmler and Hitler, was safe from Heydrich’s scathing
attacks, even the master of the presses himself – fellow oligarch
Joseph Goebbels occasionally wandered into the sights of Das
Schwarze Korps.
Unsurprisingly, Heydrich used Das Schwarze Korps to
attack all of his favorite targets, the church in particular, going so
far as to combine his role as the editor in chief of Das Schwarze
Korps with his position as head of the Gestapo by alleging church
scandals in Das Schwarze Korps and then using those self-same
“journalistic” articles as evidence in his judgments as head of the
Gestapo to pack stubborn churchmen off to concentration
camps.156 Even Mussolini came under a withering assault from
Heydrich’s personal attack dogs as Das Schwarze Korps
mercilessly assailed the 1936 Italian military campaign against
Abyssinia in direct opposition to Goebbels’ pro-Italian line.157
His attacks were also directed at fellow party members
whom he saw as deviating from the proper course of National
Socialism. Das Schwarze Korps routinely attacked bourgeois
culture, reactionary conservatism, and the infamous corruption of
the part’s numerous Gauleiters. Likewise, big business was
regularly assaulted, and Heydrich did everything he could to
conflate the public image of international business with the Zionist
conspiracy theories that so pervaded National Socialism.158 Nor
did Heydrich have any sympathy for armchair Nazis who enjoyed
titular party membership but did not actively devote themselves to
its ideological mission, or whom spoke much of their commitment
but were not prepared to take tangible action in support of the
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revolution – “A party card is not a meal ticket” and “One cannot
live by catchwords and gimmicks – history is made by individuals
who perform deeds and not those who make speeches.”159 Though
the latter comment, a scathing attack directed at Goebbels, sorely
undervalued just how much the Propaganda Minister’s speeches,
gimmicks, and Führer cult underpinned the entire National
Socialist system.
In addition to its role as a Heydrich’s personal bully pulpit,
Das Schwarze Korps also served as a highly effective medium to
bring the latest ideological radicalization from the dual minds of
Himmler and Heydrich directly to the rank and file SS. Like
everything else in the SS-state it helped to establish firm roots for
the growing SS community and Heydrich used it as an aggressive
implement of indoctrination:
What does this new form of struggle demand from
us, the SS? We have to improve ourselves. We have
to discipline ourselves, to deepen and follow the
principles of our worldview, given to us by the
Führer. We have to ideologically co-ordinate
ourselves so that all of us think alike of our enemies
and fundamentally exclude them, without making
any personal selfish or compassionate exceptions.160
Heydrich’s message in Das Schwarze Korps perfectly encapsulated
the ideological mission of the SS state – itself by far the most
assiduously totalitarian wing of the National Socialist revolution.
He ceaselessly exhorted his comrades to harden themselves, to
disregard personal motives and human compassion in pursuit of a
higher goal. To shed whatever vestigial remains of liberal
bourgeois society might still cling to their consciousness and
embrace the National Socialist mission unconditionally as he
already had. Armed with this worldview, Heydrich helped open the
door to endless radicalization within the SS and the Third Reich in
general. He was not the genesis of Nazi ideological radicalization.
The lion’s share of that responsibility rested first with Hitler then
Himmler and Goebbels, but Heydrich played a paramount role in
the creation of an all-encompassing system of ideological
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repression to crush dissent in the name of the revolution. All the
while, he played a crucial role as both the guardian of both the
movement's revolutionary consciousness and as an adroit conduit
of radicalization to the black uniformed masses. Heydrich was, as
Admiral Wilhelm Canaris so aptly characterized him, “the
cleverest brute of them all.”161 Considering Heydrich’s talent for
repression, indifference to murder, and boundless paranoia, it is
hardly surprising that he – and the security apparatus he engineered
– became the chief architect of mass population expulsions and the
largest genocide in human history. In the twisted character of
Reinhard Heydrich, National Socialism had truly found its KnightErrant, the “man with an iron heart.”162

Conclusion
Bearing in mind the unique and pivotal roles played by each of the
Third Reich’s most prominent oligarchs, it becomes virtually
impossible to envision the Reich without them. Could the German
economy have been so totally transformed from the civilian
economy of the Weimar Republic to the war economy of the Third
Reich without the systematic Nazification of industry and
disarmament of the traditional bourgeois economic elite
undertaken by Göring? As Hitler withdrew from the public eye,
could Goebbels’ role as the spokesman of the crumbling Reich
have been adequately filled by another? Could the Final Solution
have been executed without the existence of the Schutzstaffel and
its undisputed hegemony over the tools of state repression,
including its infamous SS-VT that sprang from the apocalyptic
philosophy of Heinrich Himmler? What form might the Nazi reign
of terror in occupied Europe have taken – especially in the east –
without the cold, yet pragmatic mind of the National Socialist
ideological crusader, Reinhard Heydrich?
We will never truly know the answer to any of these
questions. Yet, in the final analysis, it remains obvious that the rise
and maintenance of the National Socialist state did not reside with
Hitler alone. While it is important – nay, crucial – that the Third
Reich be viewed as a revolutionary totalitarian oligarchy, and not
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as a generic totalitarian dictatorship, it is equally essential that this
premise not be abused for the goals of historical apologists. It
would be a mistake to contend that Hitler was a weak Führer
unable to control his subordinates, or that he was somehow
unaware of the actions of his oligarchs. Such assertions miss the
significance of Hitler’s leadership style. The dynamic relationship
between Hitler and the actions of his oligarchs was best described
in Himmler’s statements in favor of extramarital affairs (as part of
his preparations for the Lebensborn program) to the Expert
Advisory Panel on Population and Racial Policy in June of 1937 –
“I am certainly not alone, but am acting with the Führer’s
approval, for I have had repeated conversations with him on the
subject.”163 Or Goebbels statements on solving the Berlin’s
“Jewish Question” to Police Chief von Helldorf in April of 1938,
“Then we put it to the Führer. He agrees, but only after his trip to
Italy.”164
Hitler had no need to rule as an absolute dictator, his
chosen system of totalitarian oligarchy served both his and the
National Socialist revolution's goals perfectly. The German state
was jealously divided between party functionaries, each pursuing
the movement’s revolutionary agenda according to their own
vision, each feeding the spiral of radicalization in a ceaseless effort
to curry favor with the Führer. Thus, each oligarch, regardless of
his power base or personal influence, remained utterly dependent
on Hitler as the ultimate source of legitimacy, authority and
arbitration, the veritable messiah of the National Socialist
movement. Hitler for his part remained secure in the knowledge
that as long as his oligarchs remained dependent on his blessing, he
was free to micromanage whatever aspect of the state interested
him at the time – be it diplomacy, armaments production or
military strategy. He could rule the rest of the Reich through his
intercessionaries without needing to overtly involve himself in all
aspects of state at all times, his oligarchs saw to that of their own
accord. Despite its relentless propaganda to the contrary, leader
cult and Führer principle, National Socialism was never a one-man
show. It was an ensemble project; a revolution and oligarchy built
upon the twisted talents, obsessions, and peccadilloes of numerous
men with Hitler positioned at its apex – but by no means ruling
alone.
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